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MUNICIPALITIES VERSUS GUN MANUFACTURERS: WIN PUBLIC
NUISANCE CLAIMS JUST DO NOT WORK
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1997, 13,677 people were killed and 47,453 more people were
injured as a result of the criminal use of firearms in the United
States. 1 The direct and indirect costs of gun violence to the United
States is estimated to be one-hundred billion dollars a year with cities
bearing a substantial amount of that cost. 2 Between law enforcement
and emergency health care service, the budgets of major cities are
significantly affected by the sheer volume of injuries sustained by
these victims. 3
In an effort to reclaim their money, cities and municipalities have
recently commenced litigation against gun manufacturers for the
losses incurred. 4 Along with theories of negligence and negligent
marketing, cities are attempting to recover based on claims of public
nuisance. 5 Because these claims are novel concepts, jurisdictions are
in conflict over the extension of the tort of public nuisance to gun
manufacturers. 6 For instance, in some jurisdictions, public nuisance
claims have survived the burden of pleadings, thus allowing a case to
move forward to trial. 7 On the other hand, some gun manufacturers
1. See Nonfatal and Fatal Firearm-Related Injuries - United States, 1993-1997, MoRBIDITY AND MoRTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention) (Nov. 19, 1999), available at http:/ /www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4845a1.htm; see also Injuries from Violent Crime, 199298, (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics) Qune 2001),
available at http:/ /www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ivc98.htm (noting that
among the average annual 21,232 homicide victims age twelve or older between 1992 and 1998, 72% of the victims were killed with a firearm).
2. See, e.g., Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Facts and Information,
Research, Firearm Facts, The Economic Costs of Gun Violence -All Americans Pay a High Price Qan. 16, 2001), available at http:/ /www.bradycampaign.org/facts/research/firefacts.asp [hereinafter Brady Campaign];
Connecticut Court Denies Gun Appeal, AssociATED PRESS, Oct. 1, 2002, available
at 2001 WL 28014345 (noting that Bridgeport, Connecticut spent $100 million on overtime for police and medical costs related to gun violence).
3. See generally Adam Cohen, Guns in the Courtroom, Making a Case Against the
Manufacturers, TIME, July 6, 1998, available at 1998 WL 11649185 (noting
that a reason behind gun manufacturer litigation is to recover the cost of
gun crimes, which impact the city budget); Brady Campaign, supra note 2
(stating that the costs associated with one gun crime, which include medical treatment and judicial resources to prosecute the criminal user of the
firearm, can reach up to $1.79 million).
4. See infra Part II.B.2.
5. See infra Part II.B.2.
6. See infra Part II.B.2.a-c.
7. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
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have been victorious in other jurisdictions when public nuisance
claims have been struck down for failing to meet all of the elements. 8
Maryland courts have not yet faced the issue of gun manufacturer
liability based on public nuisance. 9 However, statutes and case law
provide valuable insights on the viability of a public nuisance claim
against a gun manufacturer in Maryland. Maryland follows the traditional common law of nuisance, 10 which involves an activity on one
person's land that affects a right common to the community. 11 Consequently, in order for a gun manufacturer to be held liable under a
theory of public nuisance in Maryland, a municipality cannot focus on
the unauthorized use of the non-defective gun produced by the manufacturer but, rather, demonstrate that manufacturing guns on the
manufacturer's property affects a right common to the surrounding
community. 12
Municipalities bringing gun manufacturer liability suits, however,
usually do focus on the unauthorized use of the gun and the resulting
injuries. 13 A public nuisance claim could only be successful against an
entity with control over the activity being performed on its property,
such as manufacturing. 14 This basic characteristic of public nuisance
substantially undermines claims brought by municipalities seeking to
hold gun manufacturers liable for the injuries resulting from the unauthorized use of their product. 15 Without a common law basis, gun
manufacturers could be held liable if the unauthorized use of their
product was legislatively designated as a public nuisance. 16
The Maryland General Assembly has created public nuisances
through the enactment of statutes. 17 These statutes prohibit running
houses of ill-fame, 18 keeping of gambling equipment, 19 and polluting
bodies of water20 by making each activity a statutory nuisance. One
statute even prevents a claim of private nuisance to be brought against
8. See infra Part ILB.2.1H:.
9. See generally Lawrence S. Greenwald & Cynthia A. Shay, Municipalities Suits
Against Gun Manufacturers' Legal Folly, 4]. HEALTH CARE L. & PoL'v 13 n.2
(2000).
10. See infra Part liLA.
11. See infra Part liLA.
12. See infra Parts liLA, IV.
13. See infra Part ILB.2; see also generally City of Philadelphia v. Beretta, U.S.A.
Corp, 277 F.3d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 2002); Camden County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245, 251 (D.NJ.
2000).
14. See infra Parts liLA, IV.
15. See infra Part IV; see also City of Manchester v. Nat'!. Gypsum Co., 637 F.
Supp. 646 (D.R.L 1986); Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co.,
984 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1993).
16. See infra notes 60-66, 215 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part IILB.
18. Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 15 (1996).
19. !d. § 237.
20. Mo. CooE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 4-402, 9-302 (1996).
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sport shooting ranges. 21 Notably, there exists no statutory authority
classifying any activity by a gun manufacturer or subsequent criminal
use of a handgun as a nuisance. 22 Before reaching a conclusion on
the success of a public nuisance claim against a gun manufacturer, the
fundamental principles of the tort of nuisance and products liability
must be considered.
This Comment will analyze whether a public nuisance claim against
a gun manufacturer under Maryland law would be successful. First,
the tort of nuisance will be shown to have originated as an outgrowth
of the tort of trespass in early English common law. 23 The tort of
nuisance provided a judicially created remedy to property owners who
suffered damages because of the activities performed on a neighbor's
land. 24 This tort differed from trespass because there was no need to
show a direct invasion onto another's property. 25 Thus, a successful
nuisance claim proved that a property owner had control over his or
her activities and that those activities affected the use and enjoyment
of the adjacent properties. 26 The fundamental principle of the tort of
nuisance remained unchanged when the United States adopted the
English common law. 27
This Comment will then discuss the law of public nuisance in the
United States, paying special attention to products liability actions. 28
With confusion seeping into the tort of public nuisance because of
vague statutes, section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and case
law sought to clarify the boundaries of nuisance law. 29 This Comment
will also examine the failures of public nuisance claims brought by
municipalities against manufacturers of toxic chemicals 30 and asbestos
products. 31 The current split in jurisdictions regarding the success of
a public nuisance claim against a gun manufacturer will be reviewed
to demonstrate that, at best, public nuisance claims have survived the
burden of pleadings. 32
Next, this Comment will discuss gun manufacturer liability and the
tort of public nuisance under Maryland law. 33 The analysis will focus
on the Maryland courts' consistent adherence to the English common
law principles of the tort of nuisance. 34 Furthermore, this Comment
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Mo. CODE ANN., CTS. &Jun. PROC. § 5-403.1 (1998).
See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying note 67.
See infra Part II.B. I.
See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.l.a.
See infra Part II.B. Lb.
See infra text accompanying notes 116, 121, 123.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part liLA.
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will examine public nuisances in Maryland statutes to highlight the
absence of a statute geared towards gun manufacturers. 35 The discussion of Maryland law will conclude with an analysis of both Kelley v.
R.G. Industries, Inc., 36 a case in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland held manufacturers of handguns known as Saturday Night Specials strictly liable, and the Maryland General Assembly's subsequent
overruling of the Kelley decision. 37
The stage will then be set to consider whether, under Maryland
common law, a municipality's public nuisance claim against a gun
manufacturer would succeed. The analysis will demonstrate that, in
Maryland, a public nuisance claim covers only those injuries that are a
direct result of activities occurring on a gun manufacturer's property.38 Therefore, this Comment will achieve a logical conclusion: a
public nuisance claim brought against a gun manufacturer under Maryland common law, in the absence of any statutory authority, should
be struck down in order to preserve the tort's legal significance. 39
II.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC NUISANCE

A.

The Creation and Development of Nuisance in England

The tort of nuisance developed as a common law crime in England
early in the thirteenth century. 40 "Nuisance," a term capable of almost unascertainable definition, 41 applies to a wide set of circumstances.42 Originally developed as a private tort tied to the land, 43 a
nuisance action was generally brought when a person interfered with
another's use and enjoyment of his or her land. 44 However, the "interference" was not the result of a neighbor dispossessing a person of
their land or an actual trespass upon another's land. 45 Instead, the
"interference" arose from activities taking place on a person's land
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

See infra Part III.B.
304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985); see infra Part III.C.l.
See infra Part III.C.2.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
William L. Prosser, Private Action far Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 99798 (1966).
See id. at 997 (stating that the term nuisance possesses a "fascinating variety
of orthography"); see also F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q.
REv. 480 (1949) (stating that a difficulty exists in a definition because the
boundaries of nuisance are "blurred"); SIRjAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEw OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND, 104-05 (2d. ed. 1890) (declaring that nuisance is a term that has the broadest possible meaning).
Prosser, supra note 40, at 1000 (listing examples such as "public profanity,"
"keeping of diseased animals," "shooting fireworks in the streets," and "indecent exposure").
Newark, supra note 41, at 482.
/d.
Prosser, supra note 40, at 997.
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that affected the enjoyment of another's land or the right of an
easement. 46
Depending upon the type of interference, nuisance is classified as
either "private nuisance" or "public nuisance." 47 A "private nuisance"
involves interference with the right to enjoyment of one's land. 48 The
individual whose rights have been invaded is solely entitled to a remedy for a private nuisance. 49 The tort of "public nuisance," on the
other hand, developed from interference with the right of an easement.50 However, the tort grew at common law to become a broadbased criminal offense "consisting of an interference with the rights of
the community at large." 51 This Comment will focus on the tort of
public nuisance. 52

1.

Public Nuisance in English Common Law

The list of rights common to the public expands proportionately to
the list of public nuisances. 53 In early English common law, the public
had the right to safely walk along public highways, to breathe unpolluted air, to be undisturbed by large gatherings of disorderly people
and to be free from the spreading of infectious diseases. 54 Thus, a
person who interfered with those basic rights common to the public
had committed a criminal offense against the King and the crown
could bring an action for public nuisance. 55
However, the tort of public nuisance was subject to limitations. 56
The two main limitations focused on the utility of the activity causing
the alleged public nuisance, as well as the location of the activity. 57
One commentator highlighted an early case where offensive odors
emitted from a candle-making factory located in a town did not constitute a public nuisance because the discomforts endured by the com46. ld.; see also Newark, supra note 41, at 482 (describing that blocking a public
right of way along a highway was considered an "unlawful encroachment
against the king").
47. Prosser, supra note 40, at 999 (stating that private and public are the "only
two kinds" of nuisance whose sole similarity lies in the general way that
each one inconveniences someone).
48. Prosser, supra note 40, at 999.
49. ld.
50. Newark, supra note 41, at 482 (asserting that public nuisance found its origins in the obstruction of the public right of way and highways).
51. Prosser, supra note 40, at 999; see also STEPHEN, supra note 41, at 105 (asserting that a public nuisance must inconvenience "the public in the exercise
of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects").
52. See generally supra Part I.
53. See STEPHEN, supra note 41, at 104-05 (observing that the tort of nuisance
can cover any number of crimes and was attractive for lawyers wanting to
get "a wide sweep to the criminal law").
54. ld. at 105.
55. ld.; Newark, supra note 41, at 482.
56. STEPHEN, supra note 41, at 106.
57. See id.
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munity surrounding the factory were outweighed by the utility of the
factory's production of candles. 58 Additionally, it is assumed that the
common interest in an urban community should allow for reasonably
higher levels of noise and pollution than in a rural community. 59
2.

Public Nuisance in English Statutory Law

Although the tort of public nuisance was deeply rooted in the early
development of the common law, 60 Parliament's power emerged in
the fifthteenth century to create public nuisances not found in the
common law and to authorize certain activities that were previously
held to be public nuisances by the courts. 61 Because a public nuisance, by its nature, offended both the King and the community, Parliament was capable of defining the boundaries of public nuisance law
through its role as an "instrument of royal government and the voice
of the community." 62 Specifically, statutes provided another significant limitation in the determination of public nuisances. 63 It was
within Parliament's discretion to determine which lawful acts constituted public nuisances. 64 Parliament also had the authority to authorize activities that would otherwise have been unlawful under the
common law of public nuisance. 65 Thus, once Parliament authorized
an activity, it ceased to be a public nuisance. 66

B.

The Development of Public Nuisance in the United States

Public nuisance became part of early American law when the English common law was adopted in the United States. 67 Although the
tort of public nuisance retained its common law characteristics, 68 confusion arose when state legislatures first began enacting public nui58. !d. at 106. But see 1 SIR WILLIAM RussELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 436 (photo. reprint 1979) (1865) (questioning the reasoning utilized in the case because, regardless of the overall utility in making candles,
it is unnecessary to produce them in a town).
59. STEPHEN, supra note 41, at 106 (stating that a law in a city requiring similar
"quietness and purity of air" as would be found in the countryside would be
"absurd").
60. Newark, supra note 41, at 481.
61. See STEPHEN, supra note 41, at 107; 2 J.W. CECIL TuRNER, RussELL ON CRIME
1387 (reprint 1986) (12th ed. 1964); RJ. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 58 (6th ed. 1985).
62. A.L. Brown, Parliament, c. 1377-1422, in THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 111 (R.G. Davies &J.H. Denton eds., 1981).
63. STEPHEN, supra note 41, at 107.
64. !d.
65. See id. (citing an English case, R. v. Train, 2 B. and S., 640, where the statute
that authorized the railway nullified a public nuisance claim that the passing trains frightened nearby horses and hindered traffic on an adjacent
road).
66. !d.
67. Prosser, supra note 40, at 999.
68. Id.
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sance statutes. 69 One commentator claimed that the statutes defined
public nuisances in a "general and rather meaningless fashion." 70 Because of the ambiguous language in early public nuisance statutes, 71
legal interpretation problems arose when an activity did not fit into
any category of public nuisance recognized by common or statutory
law. 72 In an effort to clarify this ambiguity, section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is often cited to provide insight on the basic elements of a public nuisance? 3 Section 821B states:
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public.
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include the
following:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public
peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or
has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as
the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant
effect upon the public right. 74
Essentially, a public nuisance must be substantial and "objectionable
to the ordinary reasonable man." 75
A public nuisance can be described as either an "absolute nuisance"
or a qualified nuisance. 76 The main difference between an absolute
public nuisance and a qualified public nuisance is the plaintiff's burden of proof. A person who performs an activity that is found to be an
absolute public nuisance is strictly liable. 77 Moreover, a plaintiff in an
absolute nuisance action needs to show intentional or reckless con69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 999-1000.
See generally City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611,
614 (7th Cir. 1989); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303,
315 (3d Cir. 1985); Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539, 552, 479
A.2d 1321, 1327-28 (1984); Robie v. Lillis, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (N.H. 1972).
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 821B (1979).
Prosser, supra note 40, at 1002; see also Robie, 299 A.2d at 158 (stating that
paramount to a finding of public nuisance is whether the alleged interference is "substantial").
Jacko v. Bridgeport, 213 A.2d 452, 453 (Conn. C.P. 1965) (stating that a
public nuisance may give rise to an action for both an absolute nuisance
and for negligence).
Conn. Bank & Trust Co. v. Mularcik, 174 A.2d 128, 130 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1961) (asserting that an absolute nuisance involves strict liability).
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duct creating a hazard upon which absolute liability attaches. 78 On
the other hand, a qualified nuisance is based on negligent conduct
that creates an unreasonable risk of harm. 79 Consequently, negligence on the part of the defendant is an essential element of a qualified nuisance claim. 80 The duty of care standard is that of a
reasonably prudent person in light of an activity which could potentially be unreasonably dangerous. 81
These specific modifications to the action of public nuisance are
relevant to the recent trend of products liability cases. 82 Courts have
refused to extend the tort of public nuisance to products because a
public nuisance involves an activity tied to the land. 83 A product, however, is not tied to the land but manufactured with the purpose of
leaving the manufacturer's control to be purchased on the open market.84 The following three cases demonstrate this inherent flaw in
bringing a public nuisance action against a manufacturer.

1.

The Failure of Public Nuisance Claims in Products Liability
Actions

a.

City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.

In City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 85 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of a public nuisance claim brought by a municipality against a buyer
of polychlorinated byphenyls (PCBs). 86 PCBs from Westinghouse's
factory were improperly disposed in a Bloomington landfill, and subsequently leaked into the city's sewer system. 87 With the health of the
city's inhabitants in jeopardy,88 the City of Bloomington sought to recapture its cleanup and water treatment expenses from Westinghouse
78. See generally Young v. Groenendal, 159 N.W.2d 158, 159 (Mich. Ct. App.
1968) (stating that an absolute nuisance can be described as a "classic" or
"standard" nuisance, such as an intentional unreasonable interference with
the land of another).
79. See Conn. Bank, 174 A.2d at 130.
80. !d.
81. See Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 441 A.2d 620,624 (Conn. 1982) (holding
the defendant home-builder liable for failing to use reasonable care in the
installation of a septic system, which broke down and caused sewage to surface in the plaintiff homeowner's backyard).
82. See generally Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915
(8th Cir. 1993); City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d
611 (7th Cir. 1989); City of Manchester v. Nat'! Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp.
646 (D.R.I. 1986).
83. Tioga, 984 F.2d at 920 (stating that the State's nuisance statute did not apply to products liability cases).
84. Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace, 617 F. Supp. 126, 133 (D.N.H. 1984).
85. 891 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1989).
86. !d. at 613. Westinghouse used PCBs in its manufacturing of capacitors. !d.
87. !d.
88. See id. Long-term exposure to PCBs can cause skin rashes and liver malfunction. !d.
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on a claim of public nuisance. 89 The Seventh Circuit held that the
City had failed to cite any case that upheld a public nuisance claim in
a products liability action. 9 ° Furthermore, the court held that Westinghouse was not liable under a public nuisance theory because,
based on section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the City had
failed to show that the defendant had interfered with a "'right common to the general public.' "91
b.

City of Manchester v. National Gypsum Co.

The court in Bloomington cited another products liability case, City of
Manchester v. National Gypsum Co., 92 to re-affirm the concept that public nuisance claims cannot be justified in products liability actions. 93
Manchester involved a suit brought by a municipality against manufacturers of asbestos. 94 The City of Manchester purchased plaster-ceiling
materials laden with asbestos from the defendant for use in public
buildings and schools during a thirty-year period. 95 The City alleged
that people regularly using the buildings were faced with a "serious
health danger." 96 It brought an action against National Gypsum for
the recovery of damages resulting from the removal and disposal of
the asbestos-contaminated plaster. 97
The court stated that the City's public nuisance claim was contingent upon whether National Gypsum had control over the instrumentality that caused the nuisance. 98 The court held that the City of
Manchester, not National Gypsum, had control over the instrumentality for thirty years, leaving National Gypsum powerless "to abate the
nuisance." 99 With a basic element of public nuisance missing, the
court concluded that a dismissal of the public nuisance claim was
warranted. 100

89. Id. The city claimed cleanup costs in excess of $100 million. Id.
90. Id. at 614.
91. Bloomington, 891 F.2d at 614 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS
§ 821B).
92. 637 F. Supp. 646 (D.R.I. 1986).
93. Id. at 656.
94. Id. at 648.
95. !d.
96. Id. The people who normally frequented the buildings included teachers,
school children, maintenance and administrative personnel. Jd.
97. Id. at 649. The city claimed monetary damages in excess of $6 million. Id.
at 649 n.l.
98. Manchester, 637 F. Supp. at 656. The instrumentality creating the nuisance
in this case was asbestos. Id.
99. !d.
100. !d.
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Tioga Public School District v. United States Gypsum Co.

In a more recent case with almost identical facts, 101 Tioga Public
School District v. United States Gypsum Co} 02 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also held that there was an insufficient
basis for a public nuisance claim against a manufacturer of asbestos
products. 103 Utilizing the logic of Manchester, 104 the court held that
United States Gypsum did not have control over the instrumentality
and, therefore, was not liable under a claim of public nuisance. 105
Even though public nuisance claims brought by municipalities were
dismissed against manufacturers of toxic chemicals and asbestos products, recently municipalities have attempted to use public nuisance
claims again to recover the costs of gun violence. 106 However, unlike
the manufacturers in Bloomington, Manchesterand Tioga, gun manufacturers have had mixed results in attempting to dismiss public nuisance
claims against them. 107
2.

Mixed Results: Public Nuisance Claims in Gun Manufacturer Liability Cases

In the mid-1990s, lawsuits against gun manufacturers surged. 108
Some writers believe that the success of the tobacco litigation and settlement of 1997 inspired municipalities to bring these suits. 109 The
first lawsuit, brought by the City of New Orleans on October 30, 1998,
was based upon the theories of design defect and unreasonably dangerous activity. 110 An early example of a lawsuit alleging a claim of
101. Compare id. at 648 with Tioga, 984 F.2d at 916. Tioga public school district
sought to recover as much as $1.1 million for the removal and disposal of
asbestos products manufactured by United States Gypsum. Tioga, 984 F.2d
at 917.
102. 984 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1993).
103. /d. at 921 (holding that the trial court erred in its submission of the nuisance claim to the jury).
104. See Manchester, 637 F. Supp. at 656.
105. Tioga, 984 F.2d at 920.
106. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
107. See infra Part II.B.2.
108. See Frank]. Vandall, O.K. Corral II: Policy Issues in Municipal Suits Against Gun
Manufacturers, 44 VrLL. L. REv. 547, 547-48 (1999).
109. See, e.g., Amanda B. Hill, Ready, Aim, Sue: The Impact of Recent Texas Legislation on Gun Manufacturer Liability, 31 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1387, 1402 (2000)
(discussing the merits of gun manufacturer liability cases brought by municipalities in light of the tobacco settlements); Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity
Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 549, 579-80 (2000) (stating
that the success of the tobacco settlements have "played an important role"
in the decisions by municipalities to sue gun manufacturers); Matthew Pontillo, Suing Gun Manufacturers: A Shot in the Dark, 74 ST.jOHN's L. REv. 1167,
1168-69 (2000) (noting that the lawsuits filed against gun manufacturers by
municipalities have been inspired by the success of the tobacco litigation).
110. See Complaint at 1, City of New Orleans v. Smith & Wesson Corp., (La. Civ.
Dist. Ct. Orleans Parish 1998) (No. 98-18578 Div. M), available at http:/ I

/
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public nuisance against a gun manufacturer was City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. 111 Since that lawsuit, claims against gun manufacturers by municipalities have been based primarily on a charge of public
nuisance. 112 Trial and appellate courts continue to grapple with the
novel and unique issue of applying a public nuisance claim to a gun
manufacturer. 113

a.

Cases Upholding Public Nuisance Claims: Bubalo, White, and Boston

Bubalo v. Navegar 14 was the first case to uphold a claim of public
nuisance against a gun manufacturer. 115 In its holding, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a claim of public nuisance based on Navegar's continued course of negligent conduct.U 6
The court also held that the right to be free from the reasonable fear

111.
112.

113.

114.
115.

116.

www.firearmslitigation.com/ content/ docindex/ docindex_neworleans_
more.html.
See First Amended Complaint at 23, City of Chicago v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,
(Ill Cir. Ct., Cook County, 1999) (No. 98 CH 015596), available at http:/ I
www.firearms.litigation.com.
See Complaint at 23, Bridgeport v. Smith & Wesson, Inc., (Conn. Sup. Ct.,
City of Bridgeport, 1999) (No. CV99-036-1279), available at http:/ /www.fire
armslitigation.com.; Complaint at 33, Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., (Fla. Cir.
Ct., Miami-Dade, 11th Dist., 1999) (No. 99-01941 CA 06), available at http:/
/www.firearmslitigation.com; First Amended Complaint at 2, Atlanta v.
Smith & Wesson, Inc. (Ga. State Ct., Fulton County, 1999) (No.
99VS0149217J), available at http:/ /www.firearmslitigation.com; First
Amended Complaint at 34, City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson, Inc., (Mass.
Super. Ct., Trial Dept., 1999) (No. SUVC1999-02590-C), http:/ /www.fire
armslitigation.com; Complaint at 34, Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A Corp.,
(Ohio Ct. C.P., Hamilton Co., 2000) (No. 990729), http:/ /www.firearms
litigation.com.
See White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(upholding plaintiff's public nuisance claim); Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., 1997
WL 337218 at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (upholding plaintiff's public nuisance
claim); Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 WL 147356B at *14 (Mass.
2000) (upholding plaintiff's public nuisance claim); see also Doug Morgan,
Comment, What in the Wide, Wide World of Torts is Going on? First Tobacco, Now
Guns: An Examination ofHamilton v. Accu-tek and the Cities' Lawsuits Against
the Gun Industry, 69 MISS. LJ. 521, 551-52 (1999) (noting the "unsettled"
nature of the theory of public nuisance among courts in gun manufacturer
liability cases). But see Ganim v. Smith, 1999 WL 1241909 at *13 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1999) (striking down plaintiff's public nuisance claim); Penelas
v. Arms Tech., Inc., 1999 WL 1204353 at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (noting that
plaintiff's claim of public nuisance failed); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta,
U.S.A. Corp., 2000 WL 1133078 at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (noting that the
city could not maintain an action for public nuisance).
No. 96 C 3664, 1997 WL 337218, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1997).
Id. at *5. Michael Bubalo and Daniel Doffyn were Chicago police officers
shot by an assailant using a TEC-DC9 handgun manufactured by the defendant. Doffyn was fatally wounded, and Bubalo brought suit on his behalf.
Id at *1-*2.
Id. at *3.
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of danger to one's person was a right common to the public. 117 Finally, the court asserted that for Navegar to be held liable, it did not
need to have "control" over the handgun. us Instead, the court ruled
that if the plaintiffs could show that Navegar had responsibility for or
notice of the nuisance, it would be found liable. 119
In White v. Smith & Wesson, 120 the District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio held that a qualified public nuisance claim could survive a summary judgment motion on the strength of a sufficiently
pleaded claim of negligence. 121 Similarly, strong support for public
nuisance claims were voiced in City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson. 122
In City of Boston, the Superior Court of Massachusetts held that the
plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to allow the public nuisance
claim to stand. 123 The court stated that the instrumentality that interfered with the public right to safety and health was the "illegal secondary firearms market" created and maintained by Smith and
Wesson. 124 The court remarked that the public nuisance charge
should stand, despite its novelty in Massachusetts. 125 To support its
holding, the court cited section 812B of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts126 and Massachusetts case law. 127
b.

Cases Where the Public Nuisance Claim Failed: Ganim, Penelas and
Cincinnati

In Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 128 the Superior Court of Connecticut did not strike down the claim of public nuisance; rather, the court
noted that the City of Bridgeport's Charter must be consulted for the
117. /d. at *4. However, the court did not recognize the following rights alleged
in the plaintiff's complaint as rights common to the public: the right to be
free from fear of being sprayed with bullets from "easily concealable military-style assault weapon[s]" and the right to be free from violence. /d. at
*3-*4.
118. /d. at *5.
119. /d.
120. 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
121. /d. at 829.
122. No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000).
123. /d. at *14.
124. /d.
125. /d.
126. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
127. Boston, 2000 WL 1473568, at *14 (asserting that the concept of public nuisance encompasses much more than crimes against property) (citing Leary
v. City of Boston, 481 N.E.2d 1184, 1887 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)); Hub Theatres, Inc., v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 346 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Mass. 1976)
(noting that even legislatively sanctioned business is "'subject always to the
qualification that the business must be carried on without negligence or
unnecessary disturbance of the rights of others'" (quoting Sawyer v. Davis,
136 Mass. 239, 242 (1884))).
128. No. CV990153198S, 1999 WL 1241909, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10,
1999).
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proper remedy. 129 The court stated that in the absence of statutory
authority passed by the City Council, it could not provide a judicial
remedy. 13° Furthermore, the court noted that the city council of
Bridgeport would be properly exercising the authority granted in the
city's charter by passing an ordinance against handgun manufacturers.131 The Ganim decision is an example of the deference courts normally give to the elected law-making body in a jurisdiction when the
law-making body determines the activities that constitute public
nuisances. 132
The court in Penelas v. Arms Technology, /nc. 133 established that in the
absence of statutory or judicial authority, a claim of public nuisance
against a gun manufacturer must fail. 134 The court relied on the Tioga and Bloomington cases to further support the position that the
weight of judicial opinion weighs against applying common law public
nuisance to products liability cases. 135 Also, because the defendant
did not control the instrumentality, recovery under public nuisance
would not be proper. 136
Most recently, City of Cincinnati v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp. 137 declined to
expand the common law crime of public nuisance to gun manufacturing cases. 138 The court first struck down the claim of absolute nuisance because gun manufacturing and distribution was a lawful
activity, "heavily regulated" by federal, state and local authorities. 139
The city's claim of qualified nuisance failed as well. Because a plaintiff must show negligence in order to prevail on a qualified nuisance
claim, the court held that as a matter of law the city failed to show that
the gun manufacturers had a duty to others. 140
129. Id. at *12 (quoting Keeney v. Town of Old Saybrook, 676 A.2d 795, 802
(Conn. 1996), which stated that "a city's charter is the fountainhead of its
municipal powers .... ").
130. Id. at *13.
131. Id. at *12.
132. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
133. No. 99-1941CA-06, 1999 WL 1204353, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999).
134. Id. at *4 (stating that the law of strict liability and negligence, not public
nuisance, applies to the manufacture and design of lawful products).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. No. A9902369, 2000 WL 1133078, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000).
138. !d. at *6. The court cited, in a footnote, the Tioga and Manchester cases, as
well as other asbestos-related cases, to support its assertion that public nuisance cannot apply to design and product litigation. Id. at *6 n.34.
139. Id. at *7. But see Harold H. Reader, Are Guns the Next Tobacco?, 28 A.B.A.
THE BRIEF at 2 (1999). One commentator argued that "guns are virtually
unregulated." Id. Unlike guns, almost all consumer products are under
the power of the Consumer Product Safety Commission. !d. The commentator asserted that "a child's squirt gun is more closely regulated than a
handgun in this country." Id.
140. Cincinnati, 2000 WL 1133078, at *7.
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c.

The Third Circuit Strikes Down Public Nuisance Claims: Camden and
Philadelphia
While courts in Illinois, 141 Ohio, 142 Massachusetts, 143 Connecticut,144 and Florida 145 have reached varying conclusions about gun
manufacturer liability under public nuisance law, the Third Circuit
has struck down the use of public nuisance claims against gun manufacturers.146 In Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp./ 47 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the public nuisance claim
against Beretta, a major gun manufacturer. 148 Camden County alleged that Beretta's distribution scheme created an illegal, secondary
gun market that allowed criminals greater access to Beretta's handguns.149 This criminal market, Camden County asserted, "endangered public safety, health, and peace, and imposed inordinate
financial burdens on the [County]." 150 Thus, Camden County argued
that these facts supported its claim that Beretta intentionally created a
public nuisance. 151
The court of appeals, however, disagreed. 152 Because New Jersey's
public nuisance law had never been extended to cover non-defective
products in the stream of commerce, the court held that public nuisance law was inapplicable. 153 Furthermore, the court held that even
141. Bubalo, 1997 WL 337218, at *5 (upholding a public nuisance claim against
the defendant gun munufacturer).
142. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 829 (holding that the State had stated a public
nuisance claim against gun manufacturers). But see Cincinnati, 2000 WL
1133078, at *7 (stating that the public nuisance claim failed because the
gun manufacturer did not have a duty to others).
143. Boston, 2000 WL 1473568, at *14 (holding that the public nuisance claim
against the gun manufacturer could survive the burden of pleadings).
144. Ganim, 1999 WL 1241909, at *12-*13 (affirming the dismissal of the public
nuisance claim against the gun manufacturer because the city's charter
failed to provide authorization to bring such a claim).
145. Penelas, 1999 WL 1204353, at *4 (stating that the common law of public
nuisance could not be extended to include products liability).
146. City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 426 (3d Cir.
2002) (stating that plaintifFs tort liability claims would be dismissed against
gun manufacturers "when their legally sold, non-defective products are
criminally used to injure others"); Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001) (disallowing a
public nuisance claim to be brought against gun manufacturers who were
legally selling guns).
147. 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001).
148. /d. at 538.
149. /d. at 539.
150. /d. at 538.
151. /d. at 539.
152. /d.
153. Camden, 273 F. 3d at 540 ("If defective products are not a public nuisance as
a matter of law, then the non-defective, lawful products at issue in this case
cannot be a nuisance without straining the law to absurdity."). The court
stated that other jurisdictions have adhered to the boundaries between
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if public nuisance law applied, Beretta lacked the requisite control to
abate the alleged nuisance once the handguns left Beretta's property
and entered the market. 154 The court found the distribution chain to
be too attenuated to find a direct or causal link from the alleged
source of the interference to Beretta. 155 The court concluded that
"[i]f independent third parties cause the nuisance, parties that have
not controlled or created the nuisance are not liable." 156
Less than two months after the Third Circuit entered its decision in
Camden, the court, once again, affirmed the dismissal of a public nuisance claim brought against a gun manufacturer in City of Philadelphia
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. 151 Similar to Camden County's allegations, 158
the City of Philadelphia also alleged that Beretta created an illegal
handgun market through its distribution chain that allowed unauthorized users to gain access to handguns. 159 The city claimed that it had
incurred significant costs preventing and responding to the resulting
violence stemming from the misuse of handguns. 160 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that Philadelphia failed to state a valid public nuisance claim against the defendants. 161 Employing the same reasoning
from Camden, 162 the court held that there existed no Pennsylvania
precedent that extended the law of public nuisance to non-defective
products in the stream of commerce. 163 Relying heavily on the discussion in Camden, the court also concluded that Beretta did not have the

154.
155.

156.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

public nuisance law and products liability law because otherwise nuisance
law could easily '"devour in one gulp the entire law of tort."' !d. (quoting
Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th
Cir. 1993)).
!d. at 541.
!d. Initially, Beretta sells its handguns to "federally licensed gun distributors who in turn lawfully sell those handguns to federally licensed dealers."
!d. Several links down in the chain, the gun reaches an unauthorized user
over whom Beretta has no control. Id. Therefore, no direct or causal link
to Beretta can be established. !d.
!d. The court noted that, as a federal court interpreting state law, it must
use state law precedent to predict how a state court would decide the issue.
!d. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that
there existed a future possibility that the Supreme Court of New Jersey
could expand public nuisance law to cover gun manufacturer liability cases,
but that they could not predict that it would do so at the time the ruling was
made. !d.
277 F.3d 415, 426 (3d Cir. 2002).
Camden, 273 F.3d at 539 (alleging that Beretta's distribution scheme c-reated an illegal secondary market that allowed criminals easier access to
handguns).
Philadelphia, 277 F.3d at 419.
!d.
!d. at 422.
See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
Philadelphia, 277 F.3d at 421. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit had to base its decision on Pennsylvania state law and predict
how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would decide the issue. !d.
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requisite control over independent third parties m the distribution
chain. 164
Thus, in both Camden and Philadelphia, the Third Circuit interpreted current New Jersey and Pennsylvania law to arrive at the prediction that neither state would support a public nuisance claim
against a gun manufacturer. 165 Like New Jersey and Pennsylvania,
Maryland lacks definitive legal authority on the issue of gun manufacturer liability under public nuisance law. 166 Therefore, an accurate
prediction of how the Court of Appeals of Maryland would decide the
issue requires an examination of the development of public nuisance
law in Maryland.

III.
A.

PUBLIC NUISANCE IN MARYLAND
Air, Water, Noise and Dangerous Conditions: The judicial Development
of Public Nuisance

An activity performed on a person's property is considered a public
nuisance if the resulting injury from the activity materially diminishes
the value of the neighboring properties, and seriously interferes with
the e~oyment of those properties and rights common to the public.167 This rule has been articulated many times in Maryland common law. 168 An activity can be a public nuisance either at common
law 169 or by statute. 170 The locality of the activity is a factor to consider when demonstrating how the activity injures the surrounding
area. 171 While all people have the right to breathe clean air and enjoy
164.
165.
166.
167.

168.
169.

170.
171.

/d. at 422.
See Philadelphia, 277 F.3d at 421; Camden, 273 F.3d at 541-42.
See supra notes 153, 163 and accompanying text; Part III.
See generally Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180 (1994);
Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Cae-Link Corp., 330 Md. 115,
622 A.2d 745 (1993); Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 569 A.2d 604 (1990);
Tadjerv. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539,479 A.2d 1321 (1984); Corbi v.
Hendrickson, 268 Md. 459, 302 A.2d 194 (1973); Bishop Processing Co. v.
Davis, 213 Md. 465, 132 A.2d 445 (1957); Meadowbrook Swimming Club,
Inc. v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146 (1938); Jackson v. Shawinigan
Electro Prods. Co., 132 Md. 128, 103 A. 453 (1918); Susquehanna Fertilizer
Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 20 A. 900 (1890); Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md.
1 (1881); Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123 (1873); Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 431
(1853); Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124, 516 A.2d 990 (1986).
Washington Suburban Sanitary Corp., 330 Md. at 124-25, 622 A.2d at 749-50;
Bishr;p Processing Co., 213 Md. at 472-73, 132 A.2d at 448.
See Woodyear, 57 Md. at 3 (noting that slaughterhouses are prima facie nuisances); Adams, 38 Md. at 126 (polluting the air by dirt and smoke is a
public nuisance.); Scott, 3 Md. at 446 ("It is a rule of common law, that a
man should so use his own property as not to hurt or injure another. ... ").
See Eanes, 318 Md. at 440, 569 A.2d at 606 (noting that the statute provided
that "loud and unseemly noises" were prohibited in any Maryland town or
city if they disturbed the surrounding area).
See Corbi, 268 Md. at 461, 465, 302 A.2d at 196, 197-98 (explaining that the
appellees lived in a rural area and had an increased expectation of peace
and quiet, and that they would tend to be more affected by rock music
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their property as they please, people living in certain locations, like
crowded cities, must endure more inconveniences than those living in
rural areas. 172
There are four main types of nuisance: pollution of air, 173 pollution
of water, 174 noise disturbances, 175 and dangerous conditions. 176
These types of nuisances reflect the harmful results of certain activities
being performed on a neighboring property.
1.

Pollution of the Air

Air pollution often occurs in the form of smoke or noxious odors.
In Adams v. Michael, 177 a felt-roofing factory that produced smoke, dirt
and odor was held to be a nuisance because the owners of nearby
dwellings possessed a natural right to breathe clean air. 178 The court
held that the standard for an injury was two-fold: the injury must first
materially diminish the value of the property, and, second, must "seriously interfere" with the ordinary use and comfort of the dwelling. 179
This two-fold standard was applied again several years later in Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone when fumes from a fertilizer processing plant damaged nearby houses by discoloring laundry, corroding
gutters and producing a noxious odor. 180 In other situations, the polluted air does not have to affect the property itself, but, rather, the

172.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

playing at a nearby nightclub); Meadowbrook Swimming Club, 173 Md. at 64344, 197 A. at 147 (involving residents of the rural hills of the Mount Washington area affected by a jazz orchestra playing four nights a week); Jackson,
132 Md. at 136, 103 A. at 457 (describing a city as a "locality where some
discomforts must be expected"); Euler, 75 Md. at 618-19, 23 A. at 845 ("[A]
party dwelling in the midst of a crowded commercial and manufacturing
city cannot claim to have the same quiet and freedom from annoyance, that
he might rightfully claim if he were dwelling in the country.").
Euler, 75 Md. at 618-19, 23 A. at 845-46 (stating that a person living in a city
cannot expect the same tranquility as a person living in a rural area). But see
Susquehanna Fertilizer, 73 Md. at 276-77, 20 A. at 901 (explaining that despite
the convenience of the activity in its location and expectation of the local
inhabitants, if the activity deprives another property-owner of the right to
fully enjoy his or her property then the activity must be deemed a nuisance
and judicially abated).
See Bishop Processing Co., 213 Md. at 469, 132 A.2d at 446;Jackson, 132 Md. at
128, 103 A. at 454; Euler, 75 Md. at 617, 23 A. at 845; Susquehanna Fertilizer
Co., 73 Md. at 275, 20 A. at 900; Adams, 38 Md. at 125.
See Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 63, 642 A.2d at 182; Woodyear, 57 Md. at 5; Yarema,
69 Md. App. at 130, 516 A.2d at 993.
See Corbi, 268 Md. at 464, 302 A.2d at 197; Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155,
159, 122 A.2d 475, 476 (1956); Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc., 173 Md. at
643, 197 A. at 147.
See Tadjer, 300 Md. at 550, 479 A.2d at 1326; Gallagher v. Flury, 99 Md. 181,
183,57 A. 672, 673 (1904); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Radecke,
49 Md. 217, 228 (1878); Scott, 3 Md. at 444.
38 Md. 123 (1873).
!d. at 126.
/d. at 125-26.
73 Md. at 275-76, 20 A. at 900.
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health of the neighboring occupants. In Bishop Processing Co. v. Davis,181 a factory that processed poultry by-products 182 emitted "shocking and nauseating" odors whereby the only relief for the neighboring
occupants was a change in the direction of the wind. 183 The court
upheld the action for public nuisance despite the company's efforts to
alleviate the smell. 184 In essence, the injury resulting from air pollution does not necessarily have to directly injure the property, but,
rather, diminish the property's value by affecting the use and enjoyment of the property by its inhabitants.
2.

Pollution of Water

A recognized common law right exists to enjoy the stream of water
in its most natural state. 185 Any activity that negatively changes the
condition of the water to render it unusable by property owners downstream property owners constitutes a nuisance. 186 This is also true for
underground water reservoirs.
One example of a contaminated reservoir is found in Exxon Corp. v.
Yarema. 187 The Yarema court held that Exxon was accountable under
a claim of public nuisance because gasoline that leaked from one of
Exxon's underground storage tanks had contaminated the underground water supply. 188 While Exxon argued that there was no direct
injury to the plaintiffs, the court held that there was no need to prove
direct injury. 189 Because the leak prompted the Baltimore County Department of Health to prohibit development or sale of the Yaremas'
property, the court held that the gasoline leak unreasonably interfered with their use and enjoyment of their property. 190 The court
concluded that a successful claim of public nuisance does not rest on
the physical impact of the activity, but, rather, on whether there was a
disturbance of a property right. 191
181. 213 Md. 465, 132 A.2d 445 (1957).
182. ld. at 469, 132 A.2d at 446. The by-products consisted of, among other
things, blood, feathers, bones and feet. Id.
183. Id. at 470, 132 A.2d at 447.
184. Id. The company tried to address the noxious situation through water and
chemical treatment and incineration. None of these attempted remedies
were successful. Id.
185. See Woodyear, 57 Md. at 8-9.
186. Id. at ll-12. The court stated that a slaughterhouse that disposed of blood
and entrails into a river, creating a pungent stench of decomposition had
created a nuisance. Id. at 11. One mile downstream from the slaughterhouse, a flour mill was unable to use the water and its employees often had
to stop working because of the nauseating stench. Id. at 5.
187. 69 Md. App. 124, 516 A.2d 990 (1986).
188. ld. at 148-53, 516 A.2d at 1003-05 (These reservoirs are often affected by
leaking underground fuel storage tanks).
189. ld. at 148, 516 A.2d at 1002.
190. Id. at 153, 516 A.2d at 1005.
191. ld. at 151, 516 A.2d at 1004; see also Rosenblatt, 335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180. In
Rosenblatt, although there was proof of contamination as a result of leaking
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Noise Pollution

With noise disturbances, as with water pollution, the injury is an
indirect effect on the enjoyment of property. The seminal Maryland
case in this regard is Meadowbrook Swimming Club v. Albert. 192 Several
nights a week, loud jazz music was played in an outdoor dance pavilion in Mount Washington. 193 Residents on the southeastern hills
could not "sleep, study, read, converse, or concentrate" until the music stopped playing at midnight. 194 While the court stated that not all
annoyances constitute nuisances, it held that the late-night loud music
was a nuisance that had to be abated. 195 The essence of a public nuisance claim based on a noise disturbance focuses on the physical discomfort, the vibrations, and the noise that nearby residents are forced
to endure. 196
4.

Dangerous Conditions

Dangerous conditions, the final major category of public nuisance,
can be described as an existing condition that has the potential to
injure adjacent property. There exists a basic common law right that
all people should be safe and free from the fear of physical danger. 197
The first case in Maryland to deal with that right was Scott v. Bay. 198
Scott involved defendants who owned a mining operation in a

192.
193.
194.
195.

196.

197.
198.

underground gasoline tanks, the Rnsenblatt trial court held that only adjacent owners of property were entitled to use the remedy of public nuisance.
/d. at 63-65, 642 A.2d at 182-83. The plaintiff, Thomas Rosenblatt, leased
the property from Exxon not knowing that the ground water was contaminated. !d. at 63, 642 A.2d at 182. The court concluded that subsequent
purchasers of property could not make a claim of public nuisance because
they have bargaining power that a neighboring property owner does not.
/d. at 79-80, 642 A.2d at 190-91.
173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146 (1938).
/d. at 643-44, 197 A. at 147.
/d. at 647, 197 A. at 149.
/d. at 648-49, 197 A. at 149. Over thirty-years and a new form of music later,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland once again held that loud rock music
played at a local nightclub constituted a nuisance when nearby residents
were kept awake until late night hours. See Corbi v. Hendrickson, 268 Md.
459, 464, 302 A.2d 194, 197 (1973).
See, e.g., Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956). Mrs. Gorman,
the defendant, embarked on a mission to force her neighbor, Mrs. Sabo,
and her family to leave their apartment. !d. at 160, 122 A.2d at 477. For
several years, Mrs. Gorman deliberately blasted her radio through an open
window in the direction of the Sabo apartment. !d. The window was kept
open year round, including the winter, so that the loud radio noise would
not be muffled in any way. !d. Mrs. Gorman also encouraged her children
to bang sticks and stones on metal furniture to further annoy the Sabo
household. !d. One neighbor testified that Mrs. Gorman said her intent
was "to see that Mrs. Sabo was carried out of the house either in a straightjacket or in a coffin." /d. The court affirmed Mrs. Gorman's conviction on
nuisance. /d. at 161, 122 A.2d at 478.
See, e.g., Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 431, 432 (1853).
3 Md. 431 (1853).

292

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 31

quarry/ 99 which involved blasting rocks. 200 Eventually, some rocks
were blown onto and damaged the plaintiff's property. 201 The court
concluded that no matter how lawful the business is, nor how many
precautions are taken, if an activity proves to be a nuisance then the
business must pay damages. 202
However, the court later held that machinery used in an activity was
not deemed a nuisance even though plaintiffs had shown that the machinery shared a liability common to similar machines. 203 In Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore v. Radecke, 204 Baltimore City attempted to force
the defendant to remove from his premises the steam engine he used
in his carpentry business. 205 Baltimore City argued that steam engines
had a propensity to explode, thereby starting fires, subjecting neighboring properties to increased risk of fire, raising insurance premiums, and forcing the municipality to spend more on fire-fighting, as
well as exciting the fears of the public. 206 The court disagreed, stating
that none of the circumstances asserted by the plaintiffs made steam
engines a nuisance. 207
The more recent case of Tadjer v. Montgomery Countf 08 also illustrates an attempt to utilize public nuisance to allow recovery for certain dangerous conditions. From 1950 to 1962, Montgomery County
used a tract of land as a landfill where trash was buried. 209 Mter AFA
Corporation purchased the tract in 1977, an explosion occurred, allegedly as a result of a methane build up. 210 This explosion caused
injury to the plaintiffs. 211 The Tradjer court held that the plaintiffs
failed to set forth an action for public nuisance because they did not
demonstrate that the County breached its duty to the plaintiffs. 212
Moreover, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were simply attempting to use their nuisance claims as a disguise in order to "frame an
action in negligence using somewhat different terms." 213
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

!d. at 443.
!d. at 431.
!d.
!d. at 443, 445.
See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 217-18
(1878).
!d.
!d. at 217.
!d. at 218.
!d. at 219; see also Gallagher v. Flury, 99 Md. 181, 183, 188-89, 57 A. 672, 673,
675 (1904) (noting that despite the plaintiffs' claims that a stable created
an increased risk of fire and increased insurance premiums, the court held
that a stable was not a nuisance per se).
300 Md. 539, 479 A.2d 1321 (1984).
!d. at 543-44, 479 A.2d 1323.
!d. at 544, 479 A.2d at 1323 (noting that the presence of methane was a
result of the decomposing garbage).
!d.
!d. at 554, 479 A.2d at 1328.
!d.
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Notably Absent: Gun Manufacturer Liability and Nuisance Statutes

The Maryland General Assembly has the power, within constitutional limits, to declare what shall be labeled a nuisance and provide
for its abatement. 214 Maryland's legislature has passed statutes that
specifY activities that are deemed to be public nuisances. 215 However,
manufacture and distribution of handguns is not among those specifically mentioned by statute. 216 Thus, to hold a gun manufacturer liable under a claim of public nuisance, a Maryland court would have to
rely on the common law.
In 1985, the Court of Appeals of Maryland was the first court in the
United States to fashion a new type of liability for manufacturers of
Saturday Night Specials. 217 This decision was quickly overruled by the
Maryland General Assembly218 and has never been followed by a court
in any jurisdiction. 219 However, because the Kelley holding has been
cited in recent gun manufacturer liability cases, 220 its landmark significance cannot be overlooked.
C.

Gun Manufacturer Liability in Maryland: The Landmark Kelley Holding and the Response by the Maryland General Assembly

1.

A New Type of Liability for Gun Manufacturers

In 1985, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, for the first time in
American jurisprudence, held that a handgun manufacturer may be
214. See Becker v. State, 363 Md. 77, 86, 767 A.2d 816, 820 (2001) (citing Adams
v. Comm'rs of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 173-74, 102 A.2d 830, 836 (1954) ).
215. See Mo. CoDE ANN., CTs. &Juo. PRoc. § 5-403.1 (1998) (prohibiting the use
of private nuisance actions against sport shooting ranges); Mo. CooE ANN.,
ENVIR. § 4-402 (1996) (declaring the public policy for water pollution control and abatement in Maryland); Mo. CooE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-302 (1996)
(outlining the legislative policy behind water pollution control in Maryland); Mo. CoDE ANN., HEALTH-GEN I. § 21-254 (2000) (defining the actions against foods that pose an immediate threat); Mo. CooE ANN., REAL
PROP. § 14-123 (Supp. 2001) (declaring and defining permissible nuisance
actions within Baltimore City); Mo. CooE ANN., TRANSP. I§ 21-205 (1999)
(prohibiting unauthorized traffic signs, signals and markings); Mo. ANN.
CooE art. 27, § 431 (Supp. II 2001) (prohibiting the use of buildings or
structures for the purpose of engaging in or soliciting prostitution); Mo.
ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 237 (1996) (prohibiting the keeping of a gaming table
or place).
216. See supra note 215.
217. See infra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
218. See infra Part III.C.2.
219. See Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986); Caveny
v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 534 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Armijo v. Ex
Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.N.M. 1987); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry
and Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 665 (Wash. App. 1988); Eva A. Shine, The
Junk Gun Predicament: Answers Do Exist, 30 ARiz. ST. LJ. 1183, 1195-97
(1998).
220. See, e.g., Moore, 789 F.2d at 1327; Caveny, 665 F. Supp. at 534; Armijo, 656 F.
Supp. at 775; Knott, 748 P.2d at 665.
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held liable for injuries caused by the criminal use of its handgun. 221
In Kelley v. R G. Industries, the Court of Appeals of Maryland announced a new type of liability for manufacturers of small, low-cost
handguns known as "Saturday Night Specials." 222 This new liability
was created because the court believed that the common law principles of strict liability and abnormally dangerous activity could not apply to manufacturers of handguns. 223 Asserting the need for flexibility
in the common law to address important social issues, 224 the court of
appeals fashioned strict liability for manufacturers of Saturday Night
Specials that cause injuries to victims of criminal acts. 225
The Court of Appeals of Maryland heard the Kelley case after receiving certified questions from the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland. 226 The questions were rephrased as:
1) Is the manufacturer or marketer of a handgun, in general, liable under any strict liability theory to a person injured as a result of the criminal use of its product?
2) Is the manufacturer or marketer of a particular category
of small, cheap handguns, sometimes referred to as "Saturday Night Specials," and regularly used in criminal activity,
strictly liable to a person injured by such handgun during
the course of a crime?
3) Does the Rohm Revolver Handgun Model RG38S, serial
number 0152662, fall within the category referred to in question 2? 227
Question 1 was answered in the negative, 228 while question 2 was
answered in the affirmative. 229 The court of appeals demonstrated
that its answer to question 3 would most likely be in the affirmative
but left that decision to be made by the district court as a matter of
law.23o
221. See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 159, 497 A.2d 1143, 1160
(1985)
222. Id. at 158, 497 A.2d at 1160.
223. Id. at 132, 497 A.2d at 1146.
224. /d. at 140, 497 A.2d at 1150-51.
225. /d. at 158-59, 497 A.2d at 1160.
226. Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1144. Olen]. Kelley, the plaintiff, suffered a gunshot
wound to the chest during an armed robbery at the place of his employment. He and his wife brought an action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County based in strict liability against the manufacturer of the
handgun used in the robbery. Id. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145. The manufacturer, R.G. Industries, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, removed
the case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. /d.
227. Kelley, 304 Md. at 131, 497 A.2d at 1146.
228. Id. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1152-53.
229. Id. at 158-59, 497 A.2d at 1160.
230. Id. at 159-61, 497 A.2d at 1160-61.
0
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General Strict Liability for Handgun Manufacturers

Dealing with the strict liability issue raised in the first question, the
court addressed the principles of abnormally dangerous activities and
abnormally dangerous products. 231 The factors set forth in section
520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts2 32 to outline abnormally dangerous activities were quoted, but the court concluded that the factors
were inapplicable to handgun manufacturers. 233 Maryland law did
not permit the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to extend to
alleged tortfeasors that were not owners of land. 234 Because the activity engaged in by handgun manufacturers and the subsequent use of
their handguns in crimes bore no relation to the ownership of land,
the court held that the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine did not
apply.235
To handle the next issue of whether handguns were abnormally
dangerous products, the court consulted Phipps v. General Motors
Corp. 236 The court in Phipps adopted section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 237 The factors stated in Phipps and subsequent products liability decisions required that the "product be defective when
231. Kelley, 304 Md. at 132-35, 497 A.2d at 1146-48.
232. These factors are:
(a) [E]xistence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 520 (1977).
233. Kelley, 304 Md. at 132-33, 497 A.2d at 1146-47.
234. ld. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147 (citing Toy v. Atl. Gulf & Pac. Co., 176 Md. 197,
4 A.2d 757 ( 1939)). The court of appeals also cited Yommer v. McKenzie, 255
Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969), to illustrate that the basic thrust of the abnormally dangerous doctrine is that the activity must bear a relation to the
ownership ofland. Yommer, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969). The facts of
Yommerinvolved an underground gasoline tank that leaked into the ground
and contaminated the underground water supply. /d. at 221-22, 257 A.2d at
138-39. The Yommer court held that the owners of the gasoline tanks were
strictly liable because gasoline tanks are inherently dangerous. /d. at 227,
257 A.2d at 141.
235. Kelley, 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147.
236. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
237. /d. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958. The Restatement factors concerning abnormally
dangerous products adopted into Maryland law are:
(1) [T]he product was in a defective condition at the time that it
left the possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that the defect was a
cause of the injuries, and ( 4) that the product was expected to and
did reach the consumer without substantial change in its
condition.
/d. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1965)).
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sold." 238 To make this determination, Maryland courts have employed the "consumer expectation test." 239 Specifically, to determine
if a product is defective under the consumer expectation test, a product must be sold by a manufacturer in a condition that the ordinary
consumer would not expect to be dangerous. 240 However, the Kelley
court surmised that an ordinary consumer expects a handgun to be
dangerous. 241 The normal function of a handgun, albeit dangerous,
should not be confused with a defective product. 242 Thus, the court
concluded that a manufacturer of handguns could not be held liable
under the consumer expectation test. 243
The Court of Appeals of Maryland considered another, less utilized
test: the "risk/utility test." 244 That test determined a design defect on
the basis of two alternative tests. If the product fails to perform in a
safe manner, as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in a
reasonably foreseeable manner, then the product is defective. 245 A
product is also considered defective if the plaintiff can demonstrate
that the design was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. 246
However, the defendant can overcome this evidence by showing that
the benefits of the design outweigh the risks of using that design. 247
The court, however, stated that the risk/utility test was inapplicable to
the instant case because the test only applied to a malfunctioning
product. 248 Here, the gun did not malfunction but worked as it was
intended: the projectile struck the individual in whose direction the
handgun was pointed. 249 Because neither the abnormally dangerous
theories nor the risk/utility test applied to the handgun, the Court of

238. Kelley, 304 Md. at 135, 497 A.2d at 1148.
239. ld; see also Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959 (quoting REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 402A cmt. g to show that a product is defective when
"'it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him"').
240. Kelley, 304 Md. at 135, 497 A.2d at 1148.
241. Id. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148.
242. ld.
243. ld. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148.
244. !d. at 136-37, 497 A.2d at 1148-49. The court cited Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978), which created the risk/utility test. In that
case, the plaintiff was trapped in malfunctioning machinery and sustained
injuries as a result. ld. at 447. The plaintiff alleged that the design was
defective because the machinery did not have any safety devices. !d. at 448.
The Supreme Court of California agreed with the plaintiff and gave a definition of design defect based upon the risk inherent in the design and the
utility of the design. Id. at 457-58.
245. Kelley, 304 Md. at 137, 497 A.2d at 1149.
246. ld.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
249. Id.
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Appeals of Maryland held that strict liability could not attach to handgun manufacturers. 250
b.

A Special Strict Liability for Manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials

To address the second question concerning strict liability for i~u
ries caused by Saturday Night Specials, the court began its discussion
by stating the need for flexibility in the common law to accommodate
evolving societal issues. 251 While changes in the common law are possible, the changes must be consistent with public policy enacted by the
legislature. 252 When the court of appeals decided Kelley, the current
public policy of both the United States Congress and the Maryland
General Assembly reflected an intention to prohibit the use of specific
handguns that had no job-related or sporting purpose. 253 The statutes allowed for certain types of guns to be carried or transported for
the purposes of job-related duties and competitive sport shooting. 254
Taken as a whole, these federal and state statutes reflected a legislative
policy of permitting the use of larger, well-crafted handguns for legal
job and sport settings, while restricting the public's access to small,
250. Id.; see also supra note 238 (discussing the inapplicability of the abnormally
dangerous activities doctrine).
251. Id. at 140, 497 A.2d at 1150-51.
252. Id. at 141, 497 A.2d at 1151.
253. See id. at 141-55, 497 A.2d at 1151-58. The court in Kelley discussed the
provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28. The Gun
Control Act of 1968 stated that the import and receiving of any firearm
from overseas is prohibited. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1968). Further, the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") has a "partial list," outlining the
criterion that a handgun must meet in order to be imported with an approved permit into the United States. First, the handgun must have a safety
device that can be manually operated and second, the handgun's combined height and length must be not less than ten inches. Kelley, 304 Md. at
149, 497 A.2d at 1155 (citing "Factoring Criteria for Weapons," BATF Form
4590). Maryland has enacted handgun regulation statutes in Maryland Annotated Code article 27, sections 36B-36G (1984). These statutes provide
that transporting or carrying a handgun, whether concealed or open, is
prohibited. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(b) (1984).
254. Kelley, 304 Md. at 142 n.6, 147-49, 497 A.2d at 1151 n.6, 1157-58 (citing
section 36B(c) of article 27 of the Maryland Annotated Code and quoting
The Gun Control Act of 1968). The United States Congress provided certain exceptions to the prohibition on the importation of handguns with
authorization from the Secretary of the Treasury. Specifically, if the firearm is for scientific, sport or training purposes, is not among firearms listed
in I.R.C. 5845(a) or the same person who previously took the firearm out of
the United States brings it back into the United States, then it will not be
prohibited. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)-(d). Maryland statutes provide for similar
exceptions for law enforcement. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 36E(i) (1982
& Supp. 1984). In addition to these exceptions, the Maryland statutes also
provide an exception for an individual who needs protection at home or at
his place of business by allowing the carrying and transport of a handgun
with a duly authorized permit. Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 36E (1982 & Supp.
1984).
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low-cost handguns having "little or no legitimate purpose." 255 For
these reasons, the Court of Appeals of Maryland judicially created a
new type of liability for manufacturers of small, low-cost handguns
known as Saturday Night Specials. 256
Specifically, the court posited that a trial court must first make an
initial determination, as a matter of law, that the handgun in question
possesses the characteristics of a Saturday Night Special: short-barreled, inexpensive, and having no legally legitimate use. 257 Once the
handgun is deemed a Saturday Night Special as a matter of law, the
trier of fact must determine whether three elements are present
before imposing liability. 258 First, the manufacturer and any other entity in the "marketing chain" must have manufactured the Saturday
Night Special. 259 Second, the plaintiff must suffer injury or death as a
result of the use of the handgun. 26° Finally, the shooting must have
been a criminal act. 261
c.

Determining Whether the Rohm Revolving Handgun Model RG385 Was a
Saturday Night Special

In response to question three, the court demonstrated that the
handgun at issue met the criteria to be deemed a Saturday Night Special, but declined to make that determination as a matter of law because it was a more proper determination for a trial court. 262
Assessing the dynamic principles of common law and already existing
consistent policy restricting the use of Saturday Night Specials, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland carved a limited area of liability for
manufacturers of handguns used in crimes. 263 However, this new liability was criticized as over-extending the boundaries of judicial
power, to which the Maryland General Assembly promptly responded.
2.

Overruling the Kelley Decision

The holding of Kelley v. R G. Industries was legislatively reversed by
Maryland Annotated Code article 27 section 36-I(h). 264 This section
provided that "[a] person or entity may not be held strictly liable for
damages of any kind resulting from injuries to another person sustained as a result of the criminal use of any firearm by a third person
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Kelley, 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158.
Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
Id. at 158, 497 A.2d at 1160.
ld.
Id.
Id.
ld.
ld. at 159-61, 497 A.2d at 1160-61.
ld. at 160-61, 497 A.2d at 1161.
Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 36-I(h) (Supp. 1988); see also supra Part III.C.l.b.
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"265 While the statute prohibits a strict liability action, it leaves
open the possibility for other actions brought on principles of negligence or common law. Currently, the common law principle of public nuisance is a potential action to hold handgun manufacturers
liable under Maryland law.
IV.

GUN MANUFACTURER LIABILITY AND PUBLIC NUISANCE
CLAIMS JUST DO NOT MIX: THE FINAL ANALYSIS

Given Maryland's understanding of the tort of public nuisance, a
gun manufacturer cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from the
unauthorized use of its products because the manufacturer no longer
controls the activity that causes the injury. 266 The gun manufacturer
controls only the activities occurring on its property. If that activity
causes injury to adjacent properties, then the manufacturer may be
held liable under public nuisance. 267 However, a third party's actions
are not subject to the control of the manufacturer, and, thus, public
nuisance cannot apply to a gun manufacturer in that situation.
In Kelley v. R G. Industries, the Court of Appeals of Maryland created
a new strict liability approach to hold handgun manufacturers liable
for injuries resulting from the criminal use of its products. 268 The
court also considered other products liability approaches, such as
strict liability, consumer expectation and risk/utility tests; however,
the court concluded that none of these applied to the manufacturer
of a non-defective handgun. 269 The newly formed strict liability approach of the Kelley court was legislatively overruled by the Maryland
General Assembly with the enactment of Maryland Annotated Code
article 27 section 36-I(h). 270 The statute prohibited any type of strict
liability approach to gun manufacturers. 271 Between Kelley and section 36-I(h), one of the few common law remedies available to hold a
gun manufacturer liable is the tort of public nuisance. 272
It is possible in the near future that a Maryland municipality may
attempt to recover tax dollars expended as a result of treating victims
of handgun violence under a theory of public nuisance. Like municipalities in other jurisdictions that have brought suits against gun manufacturers,273 a Maryland municipality could claim that the public
265. See Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 36-I(h) (Supp. 1988). Exceptions to this statute include conspiring or willful aiding and abetting by the person or entity
in the commission of a crime while using the firearm. !d.
266. See supra Part liLA.
267. See supra Part liLA.
268. See supra Part III.C.l.
269. See supra Part III.C.l.a.
270. See Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 836 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1998);
see also supra Part III.B.
271. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
272. See supra Part III.
273. See supra Part II.B.2.
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right to be physically safe and free from the fear of dangerous conditions is seriously interfered with when gun manufacturers allow cheap
handguns to be marketed towards the criminal element. In other jurisdictions, a public nuisance claim against a gun manufacturer has
survived the burden of pleading at best, 274 but courts usually have
struck down public nuisance claims for failing to meet all of the elements.275 Given Maryland's adherence to the basic common law principles of public nuisance, 276 a gun manufacturer could not be held
liable under such a claim without a radical departure from those
principles. 277
At the heart of a public nuisance claim is the activity that causes the
injury to the property of others. 278 The essence of public nuisance
under Maryland law is that the actor must have control over the activities being performed on his or her property. 279 Thus, the cause of the
injury must be directly related to an activity over which the actor has
control. For example, in the case of mining in a quarry, the cause of
the injury must be directly related to the act of blasting rocks. 280 Additionally, in the case of a ferro-silicon factory, the cause of the injury
must be directly related to the smoke and noxious fumes emitted during the act of processing chemicals. 281 Furthermore, in the case of a
slaughterhouse, the cause of the injury must be directly related to the
act of processing and disposing of meat by-products. 282 Therefore, it
follows that in the case of a gun manufacturer, the cause of the injury
must be directly related to the act of assembling and building handguns on the manufacturer's property.
However, in suits that claim public nuisance against a gun manufacturer, the cause of the i~uries to the victims were not directly related
to the act of assembling and building handguns. 283 The injuries are
usually caused by the unauthorized use of the final, non-defective
product of a gun manufacturer by third parties. 284 A public nuisance
claim cannot be successful in such a situation because the actions of
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

See supra text accompanying notes 116, 121, 123.
See supra Part II.B.2.b-c.
See supra Part III.A.1-4.
See supra Part liLA-B.
See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing the nuisance requirement that an actor have control over the activities being performed); see
also supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
280. See Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 431, 432 (1853).
281. See Jackson v. Shawinigan Electro Prods. Co., 132 Md. 128, 129, 134-35, 103

A. 453, 454, 456 (1918).
282. See Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. 1, 5-6 (1881).
283. See supra Part II.B.2.
284. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149 (observing that the gun in question "injured a person in whose direction it was fired," and, consequently,
the gun "worked precisely as intended").
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third parties are not under the control of the gun manufacturer and
are not related to a gun manufacturer's acts on its own property. 285
When municipalities attempt to recover costs of increased insurance premiums and medical and law enforcement expenditures due
to handgun violence, an inexpensive or low-quality handgun, while
not defective, is viewed as having certain inherent liabilities. 286 A
handgun is designed to propel a projectile at a high rate of speed in
the direction of an animal, object or person with the ultimate goal of
causing injury or death. The resulting injuries or deaths lead to increased medical expenses. 287 Moreover, additional expenditures by
law enforcement agencies and the judiciary are needed to apprehend
and prosecute the unauthorized users of handguns. 288
However, Maryland courts have already ruled that increased expenditures resulting from an activity do not constitute c;t public nuisance.289 A steam engine, despite its inherent danger of explosion
causing increased risk of fire and higher insurance premiums, was
found not to be a nuisance based on those factors. 290 A stable house
was also not held to be a nuisance based upon the same reasoning. 291
Finally, Maryland courts are reluctant to uphold a claim of nuisance
when it appears that the real claim is based in negligence. 292 In essence, the growing trend attempting to hold gun manufacturers liable
under public nuisance is actually an attempt to repackage a set of facts
that have already proven unsuccessful as negligence claims. 293
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has explored the common law and statutory aspects
of the tort of public nuisance in light of gun manufacturer liability.
Looking at its origins in the law of England, public nuisance grew
from the tort of trespass. 294 It developed to provide a remedy for
property owners who were injured, not by a direct trespass, but by an
indirect invasion as a result of an activity being performed on a neighboring property. 295 In the modern era, a public nuisance can be any
285. See City of Philadelphia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 422 (3d Cir.
2002); Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,
273 F.3d 536, 541 (3d Cir. 2001).
286. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
287. See generally Jonathan Bor, Baltimore's Street Violence Creates an npidemic of Spinal Cord Injuries, BALTIMORE SuN, July 30, 2000, at 1A.
288. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
289. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 228
(1878).
290. Id.
291. Gallagher v. Flury, 99 Md. 181, 189, 57 A. 672, 675 (1904).
292. Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539, 554, 479 A.2d 1321, 1328
(1984).
293. Id.
294. See supra Part II.A.
295. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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activity that causes air pollution, 296 water pollution, 297 noise disturbances,298 or a dangerous condition. 299
The prominence of the tort of public nuisance in gun manufacturer
litigation across the United States 300 has created the possibility that, in
the future, a Maryland municipality may follow the recent trend and
bring a similar claim in state court. When faced with this novel legal
theory, a Maryland court will be confronted with the ambiguous concept of nuisance law, 301 and a split among other jurisdictions regarding the viability of a public nuisance claim against a gun
manufacturer. 302
Despite those hurdles, a gun manufacturer defending such a claim
would be the beneficiary of the development of public nuisance law in
Maryland over the last one hundred years. 303 A court in Maryland
would be remiss in its application of the common law standards of
public nuisance if it failed to note that the activity complained of must
occur on the property of the defendant. 304 A gun manufacturer has
no control of a gun after its production is complete and it leaves the
property of the manufacturer in a non-defective condition. 305 In addition to that factor, while public nuisance law focuses on the activity
that causes the harm, there exists no case or statute in Maryland that
has determined a final, non-defective product to be a public
nuisance. 306
With the focus of public nuisance law on the activity performed on
the defendant's property, a Maryland court would have to abrogate
the common law to hold a gun manufacturer liable on a theory of
public nuisance. While courts may from time to time change the common law to adapt to changing times, 307 the integrity of the common
law and the stability of the entire legal system are preserved through
the adherence of time-honored legal standards. There is no doubt
that municipalities are grappling with the serious problem of handgun violence and its cost to the community. 308 While redefining the
common law tort of public nuisance to hold gun manufacturers liable
may be an attractive option for a court wanting to address this societal
problem, such judicial activism may be cosdy in its own right to the
stability of the entire legal system. A Maryland court upholding a pub296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra Part III.A.l.
supra Part III.A.2.
supra Part III.A.3.
supra Part III.A.4.
supra Part II.B.2.
supra note 41 and accompanying text.
supra Part II.B.2.a-c.
supra Part III.A.1-4.
supra text accompanying notes 278-82.
supra text accompanying notes 154-56, 164.
supra Part liLA-B.
Kelley, 304 Md. at 140-41, 497 A.2d at ll50-51.
supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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lie nuisance claim against a gun manufacturer in the absence of statutory authority would, in effect, be erasing the time-honored decisions
of Maryland .courts that have defined the boundaries of public nuisance for over one hundred years. In that case, the tort of public nuisance would have such limitless dimensions that it would cease to have
any meaningful legal significance. By striking down public nuisance
claims brought by municipalities against gun manufacturers now,
courts will be preserving the power of the tort of public nuisance as
the voice of the community for the future.
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